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A LTHOUGH the privilege of amending a declaration may not
L involve the obtaining of complete relief in one action, the pri-
mary objective sought by the proposal hereinbefore made to liberal-
ize the rules on joinder of parties and causes of action,' it may be
considered even more important where it determines whether
the plaintiff will obtain any relief without starting another action.
The problem here is whether the plaintiff shall be permitted to
change his pleading to correct some mistake or to meet an unfore-
seen situation when it arises in order that he may have the relief
to which he is entitled.
A. West Virginia "Liberality"
General statements of the law on amendments in West Vir-
ginia indicate great liberality, and one might be led to believe
that no injustice could result by a mere failure originally to state
the case properly. The court has often affirmed the power of trial
courts, independent of any statutory authorization, to permit the
pleadings to be amended "whenever justice will be promoted
thereby."2  A well known writer on West Virginia procedure has
stated that under the West Virginia statutes, liberally interpreted,
"... defects in the pleadings disclosed by demurrer may generally
be corrected by amendment, so that if the declaration or other
pleading is amended under the statutes, the demurrer has served
the purpose of putting the pleadings in proper form, or of gaining
a continuance, but has not led to a final disposition of the case."3
*This is the second of a series of articles by the same writer on this sub-
ject. The first article concerned the joinder of parties and causes of action
and appeared in 52 W. VA. L. REv. 137 (1950).
"Associate professor of law, West Virginia University.
I Lugar, Common Law Pleading Modified Versus the Federal Rules, 52
W. VA. L. REv. 137 (1950).
2 Shires v. Boggess, 72 W. Va. 109, 111, 77 S.E. 542, 543 (1913); National
Bank of Weston v. Lynch, 69 W. Va. 333, 334, 71 S.E. 389, 390 (1911); Staats v.
Georgia Home Ins. Co., 57 W. Va. 571, 573, 50 S.E. 815, 816 (1905); Travis v.
Peabody Ins. Co., 28 W. Va. 583, 595 (1886). In the later decisions the court
relied upon the Travis case which held that amendments might be allowed
under this power "at any time before verdict found."
3 Bums, PLEADING & PRACTCE § 199 n. 33 (3d ed. 1934). Italics supplied.
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The statutes themselves seem to sanction this same spirit of
liberality. The statute which embodies the general rules on
amendments provides:
"The plaintiff may of right amend his declaration or bill
at any time before the appearance of the defendant; and not-
withstanding such appearance, in any action, suit, motion or
other proceeding, the court, if in its opinion substantial justice
will be promoted thereby, may .. permit any pleading to be
amended ...changing the form but not the cause of action
.. and the court may allow any other amendment in matter
of form or substance in any . . . pleading . . .which may
enable the plaintiff to sustain the action, suit, motion or
proceeding for the cause for which it was intended to be
brought . . ."4
The statute permitting an amendment to cure a variance between
the pleading and proof seems even more liberal in providing:
"If at the trial of any action or motion, there appears to
be a variance between the evidence and the allegations or
recitals, the court, if in its opinion substantial justice will be
promoted thereby, may allow the pleading to be amended to
conform to the proof."5
The latter does not contain either the limitation that the
amendment shall not change the cause of action or the provision
that an amendment may be allowed to sustain the action for the
cause for which it was intended to be brought, both of which are
contained in the general statute. The revisers indicated that the
first limitation was inserted therein for the purpose of emphasis
and to conform to court decisions.6 The source of the second
limitation was not stated by the revisers, but it is similar to
language which has been used by the court in stating whether an
amendment has changed the cause of action.7 It has never been
given any separate significance by the court. Whether these
statutory limitations placed on amendments generally will be held
4 W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 4, § 24 (Michie, 1949). Italics supplied.
5 W. VA. CODE c. 16, art. 4, § 28 (Michie, 1949). Italics supplied.
G Revisers' note to W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 24 (Michie, 1949).
7 For example, in Snyder v. Harper, 24 W. Va. 206, 211 (1884), the court
stated the rule in this way: ". . . no amendment can be allowed, which in-
troduces into the cause a new and substantive cause of action different from
that declared upon, and different from that which the party intended to
declare upon, when he brought his action .. " And in Hanson v. Blake,
63 W. Va. 560, 563, 60 S.E. 589, 590 (1908), the court stressed the original
intent in this manner: ". . . the declaration herein may be amended... .
since it is convincingly apparent from the whole proceeding that such was
the original intent of the pleader. This will introduce no new cause of
action, but will permit the identical cause of action evidently undertaken
by the pleader to be declared upon to be properly averred in the declar-
ation...."
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to apply to amendments to cure variances between the allegata and
probata is not clear. However, under the earlier statutes, when
neither contained the limitation of not changing the cause of
action,8 the court applied the rule that an amendment could not
be allowed to cure such variance if it introduced a new cause of
action.0 This limitation has now been made statutory as a gen-
eral principle, but it is merely declaratory of the West Virginia
common law, so there is no reason to expect a different holding
concerning the specific situation of a variance covered by the
other statute.
B. "Changing the Cause of Action"
Since this limitation prevails over the guiding principle of
allowing amendments "to promote substantial justice",10 the true
scope of permissible amendments can only be determined when its
meaning is ascertained. This is not a task without difficulties.11
In fact, its precise meaning defies understanding in view of the
manner in which the limitation has been applied. This will be
shown presently. Aside from this uncertainty as to how the rule
will be applied, the cases adequately demonstrate that as applied
it has produced unjust results. These factors alone should be
a sufficient basis for considering some modification in the rule.
The court has never attempted to give any general guide to a
determination of what amounts to a change in the cause of action.
The usual approach has been to decide that the amendment either
does or does not involve a violation of the rule, and then either to
give no reason for the decision 2 or cite in support of the conclu-
8 W. Va. Acts cc. 71, 120 (1882); W. Va. Acts c. 41 (1911).
9 Findley v. Coal & Coke Ry., 76 W. Va. 747, 87 S.E. 198 (1915); National
Bank of Weston v. Lynch, 69 W. Va. 333, 71 S.E. 389 (1911); Hanson v.
Blake, 63 W. Va. 560, 60 S.E. 589 (1908); Staats v. Georgia Home Ins. Co.,
57 W. Va. 571, 50 S.E. 815 (1905); Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 12'
S.E. 519 (1890).
10 Note that this guide is used in both the general statute on amend-
ments and the statute on amendments to cure variances. It is also the basis
on which the court has declared that amendments may be allowed inde-
pendently of any statutory authorization, the only difference being that the
word "substantial" is there omitted. On the latter, see the cases cited in
note 2 supra.
11 "This general rule may be easily stated, but sometimes not easily
applied. What shall be regarded, for the purpose of determining the pro-
priety of amendment, as the cause of action in this case?" Clarke v. Ohio
River R.R., 39 W. Va. 732, 737, 20 S.E. 696, 697 (1894).
12 Creasy v. Thomas, 106 W. Va. 24, 144 S.E. 563 (1928); Brown v. Cook,
77 W. Va. 356, 87 S.E. 454 (1915); Staats v. Georgia Home Ins. Co. 57 W. Va. 571,
50 S.E. 815 (1905); see Ritchie County Bank v. Bee, 62 W. Va. 457, 461, 59
S.E. 181, 183 (1907).
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sion other cases which have also either allowed or refused to allow,
as the court may have held, amendments under the general rule
but involving no similarity on the facts. Where the amendment
is deemed not to involve a change in the cause of action, the court
is inclined to stress the liberality with which amendments should
be allowed.' 3 Occasionally, the court will state what appears to be
a guiding principle, but analysis indicates that the real issue has
been avoided. For example, in a recent case the court stated:
"While a rule of liberality has prevailed in the matter
of amendments, and a wide discretion is vested in the trial
court with relation thereto, it has always been held that an
amendment may not change the cause of action .... On the
other hand, where the identity of the cause of action is main-
tained throughout, an amended pleading which does nothing
more than present grounds for recovery for the same cause of
action, though different from those stated in the original
pleading, is permitted. . . . [citing many of the earlier West
Virginia cases] ."14
The one commentator on West Virginia procedure who at-
tempted to determine the meaning of "a new cause of action"
stated the rule generally in these words:
"So long as the form of action is not changed, and the
court can see that the identity of the originally intended cause
of action is preserved, the particular allegations of the declara-
tion may be changed by amendment in order to cure imper-
fection and mistakes in the matter of stating plaintiff's
cause. . . ."15
However, apparently in recognition of the fact that no real help
could be gained from that general statement, he went further but
merely to list the instances in which amendments had been per-
mitted or denied.
Perhaps the best that can be done is to follow that procedure,
but this would offer no basis for prediction except in parallel cases,
and perhaps, as applied, not even in parallel cases. Accordingly,
an attempt will be made to analyze the cases to find, if possible,
the basic considerations which seem to have influenced the court.
13 Buffa v. Baumgartner, 58 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1950); Dempsey v. Poore,
75 W. Va. 107, 83 S.E. 300 (1914); Hanson v. Blake, 63 W. Va. 560, 60 S.E1
589 (1908); Clarke v. Ohio River R.R., 39 W. Va. 732, 20 S.E. 696 (1894);
Travis v. Peabody Ins. Co., 28 W. Va. 583 (1886).
14 Morrison v. Judy, 123 W. Va. 200, 204, 13 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1941).
Italics supplied.
15 Kittle, The Law of Amendments as Applied in West Virginia, 35 W.
VA. L.Q. 64, 72 (1928). Note that the first limitation mentioned in this
quotation is no longer effective in West Virginia. See the present statute
quoted in text at page 28 supra.
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This analysis should also disclose whether the rule has been applied
consistently with these announced objectives in mind. Only in
this way can any general principles be found on which the limita-
tion may properly be defended.
C. Change in the Form of Action
Under the original formulary system of the common law, it
seems to have been the rule that an amendment would not be al-
lowed if it changed the form of action.1 No case has been found
in which the West Virginia court expressed this principle as the
basis for its decision. This may be explained by the fact that
counsel never undertook to violate this rule. In any event, it did
not follow that the cause of action had not been changed merely
because the form of action remained the same in the original and
amended declaration.1 7 The statute now provides that an amend-
ment may be permitted though it results in a change in the form
of the action, but it does not provide that a change in the cause
of action may not result without a change in the form of the
action.""
If it can be said that the West Virginia court ever used the
idea of a change in the form of an action as the basis for refusing
to allow an amendment, either Snyder v. Harperl or Mankin v.
Jones20 would be cited. Both cases involved the adding of a count
to the original declaration by amendment. In the Snyder case the
original declaration was for trespass, an assault and battery upon
the plaintiff, and the added count would have covered the assault
and battery but in addition would have included damages for
taking and carrying away certain chattels. The defendant having
objected to this amendment, the court refused to allow the second
count to be added because it was for an entirely different cause of
action, "the first count being a trespass vi et armis" and "the second
count being trespass de bonis asportatiS".1 In the Mankin case
the declaration originally contained only the common counts in
assumpsit. The plaintiff sought to amend the declaration by
1.8 This seems to have been the more usual rule, especially under the earlier
common law. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 716 (2d ed. 1947); SHIPMAN, COMMON
LAW PLrADING 296 (3d ed., Ballantine, 1923).
'7 E.g., Findley v. Coal & Coke Ry., 76 W. Va. 747, 87 S.E. 198 (1915).
1 See the quotation from the statute set forth in the text at page 28 supra.
10 24 W. Va. 206 (1884).
20 68 W. Va. 422, 69 S.E. 981 (1910).
"1 24 W. Va. 206, 211.
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adding a special count to show an express contract which was
related to an item in the plaintiff's bill of particulars. This amend-
ment was held proper since the subject matter could have been
proved also under one of the common counts. In the same case
another controverted item in the plaintiff's bill of particulars was
held not provable under any of the common counts. As to the
latter item, it was conceded that the plaintiff had a right to recover
for a breach of the express contract covering this item, but not
being provable under the original common counts the court stated
that an amendment to insert the special count would "constitute
an additional claim, and would introduce into the case a new
substantive cause of action.."2
However, it is not believed that a change in the form of action
was the basis of these decisions. In the first place, no case has been
found in which the rule was ever applied in other jurisdictions to
include a change from one division of a form of action to another
division of the same form.23  Secondly, the court in the Snyder
case seems to have stressed as the basis for the decision the fact that
the cause of action set forth in the amendment was "a new and
substantive cause of action different from that declared upon, and
different from that which the party intended to declare upon, when
he brought his action."2 4 This same factor of original intent seems
to have been controlling in the Mankin case, wherein the court
relied heavily upon the Snyder case as precedent. 2 The court
apparently did not refuse to allow the amendments because they
involved changes in the form of action. In the premises it is not
believed that in discussing the West Virginia cases any further
consideration need be given to the effect of the statutory provision
which now permits an amendment to be made though the form
of action be changed .2
22 68 W. Va. 422, 430, 69 S.E. 981, 984.
03 Where the rule was applied, it was held to prevent an amendment
which changed the form of action from assumpsit to covenant or case, or
from trespass to case, or vice versa. See the authorities cited in note 16
supra. That the rule was not to be applied between divisions of the same
form of action was recognized in one West Virginia case. In allowing an
amendment, the court said, "The change does not change the form of action,
for assumpsit may be maintained against a physician or surgeon upon his
implied undertaking to exercise proper skill arising from his simple engage-
ment as physician, as well as on an express contract to cure." Kuhn v. Brownfield,
34 W. Va. 252, 257, 12 S.E. 519, 521 (1890); cf. Travis v. Peabody Ins. Co.,
28 W. Va. 583 (1886) (common law declaration on policy of insurance changed
to the statutory form).
24 24 W. Va. 206, 211.
20 68 W. Va. 422, 430, 69 S.E. 981, 984.
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D. Change in the Pleader's Intent
Having mentioned the importance attached by the court to the
intent of the pleader in his original declaration as a controlling
factor in deciding whether he is asserting a different cause in the
amended declaration, the application of this test may now be
examined more thoroughly. Does it refer to the relief which he
intended to obtain, or to the facts which he intended to make the
basis of his recovery, or to the legal theory on which he intended
to recover? The cases in which emphasis has been given to the
pleader's intent do not make this clear.2 7  Here again the court
has used evasive language, merely referring to the amendment as
either embodying or not embodying "the same cause of action"
originally intended. The scope of this test can be determined
only by an examination of the cases to see what in fact has or has
not been permitted. A few of the cases most frequently cited by
the court will be examined here for this purpose, but the question
will be left open for further comment when the inconsistency of
the decisions is discussed.
The Snyder and Mankin cases, discussed above, might be
treated as emphasizing the relief sought.2s They indicate that the
pleader will be deemed not to have intended originally the same
cause of action if the new facts could have been the basis of another
action,29 it being immaterial whether the new facts might have
been the basis of another count and have been joined in the
M3 In other words, none of the decisions have been predicated upon the
limitation which was removed by the revisers. This apparent liberalization
in the rules on amendments does not reach the basis on which the right
to amend has ever been denied in West Virginia.
27 E.g., Hanson v. Blake, 63 W. Va. 560, 60 S.E. 589 (1908); Snyder v.
Harper, 24 W. Va. 206 (1884).
28 See, however, the discussion of the Findley case and the Hayes case in
the text at page 47, infra, wherein it is pointed out that amendments
were not permitted even though the same relief was sought under the amend-
ments. Those cases indicate that in addition the theory of law on which
recovery is sought may not be changed, that being deemed a change in the
cause of action.
20 In the Snyder case the plaintiff could have brought a separate action
for the chattels which the defendant removed. See text page 31 supra. In
the Mankin case the express contract could have been used as a basis of
another action. See text at pages 31-32 supra. In neither case was the ad-
ditional claim provable under the original declaration, but other claims were
provable thereunder. This reasoning seems inconsistent with the holding
in Morrison v. Judy, 123 W. Va. 200, 13 S.E.2d. 751 (1941) and the dicta
in Ritchie County Bank v. Bee, 62 W. Va. 457, 461, 59 S.E. 181, 183 (1907),
both of which would permit amendments where the proof fails as to the facts
originally alleged and recovery for only one claim is asserted in the amended
7
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original action.o The same result follows whether the plaintiff is
seeking to combine by the amendment the several actions which
he might have joined31 or whether he seeks merely to drop the
original action and substitute by amendment the action which he
might have originally joined. 2
However, this intent is not important when the plaintiff has
originally joined counts or actions which cannot be joined either
because the counts are in the wrong forms of action 33 or because
the parties defendant cannot be joined.3 4  In either event, the
plaintiff may be permitted to amend by omitting either group of
the misjoined counts.'3 Policy considerations might be supported
here by reasoning that since the plaintiff sued for more, he will be
permitted to sue for part of that which was originally included.
However, the pleader's original intent has been altered.
Prolixity in pleading is encouraged by this application of the
test since even if the pleader goes so far as to combine counts im-
properly he will be permitted to drop the ones improperly joined,
and he has less assurance that he would be permitted to add or
substitute a count to meet a variance in proof affecting either his
factual or legal right to recover a judgment against the defendant.
The advisability of lengthy pleadings as long as the law of
amendments is circumscribed by existing restrictions is demon-
strated by those West Virginia cases which involve the pleader's
intent concerning the legal theory on which he seeks to obtain
relief. This group of cases also probably indicates as strongly as
any other the hardship which the rule not permitting a change in
the cause of action may produce unless the pleader takes into con-
pleading. The problem here is one of changing the cause of action and
not joinder of causes. See note 99 infra and the text to which it refers.
30 Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 128 W. Va. 590, 37 S.E.2d 450 (1946); Snyder
v. Harper, 24 W. Va. 206 (1884). Other courts have held that a cause which
might originally have been joined may be inserted by an amendment. Ray-
mond v. Bailey, 98 Conn. 201, 118 At. 915 (1922).
31 Mankin v. Jones, 68 W. Va. 422, 69 S.E. 981 (1910); Snyder v. Harper,
24 W. Va. 206 (1884).
32 Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 128 W. Va. 590, 87 S.E.2d 450 (1946); Findley
v. Coal & Coke Ry., 76 W .Va. 747, 87 S.E. 198 (1915), read with Shaffer
v. Western Maryland Ry., 93 W. Va. 300, 116 S.E. 747 (1923).
33 O'Neal v. Pocahontas Transportation Co., 99 W. Va. 456, 129 S.E. 478
(1925); Shafer v. Security Trust Co., 82 W. Va. 618, 97 S.E. 290 (1918);
Wells v. Kanawha & M. Ry., 78 W. Va. 762, 90 S.E. 837 (1916).
34 Knotts v. McGregor, 47 W. Va. 566, 35 S.E. 899 (1900).
35 Cases cited notes 33 and 34 supra.
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sideration in his original pleadings every possible theory on which
he may recover.
An excellent case for illustration is Findley v. Coal & Coke
Ry. 0 Here the plaintiff sued as administrator to recover under the
state statute damages for the death of his decedent by a wrongful
act of the defendant. At the first trial the defendant was granted
a directed verdict on the alleged insufficiency of the plaintiff's
evidence. After the case on writ of error had been reversed and
remanded, the defendant for the first time disclosed its defense.
The defendant proved that the plaintiff's decedent was, at the
time of his death, employed in the operation of a train which,
although operated on an intrastate railroad, carried nine cars which
had come from points outside the state under through contracts
of carriage for delivery in the state. Before submission of the case
to the jury, the plaintiff was permitted to amend his declaration to
claim a right of recovery under the new state of facts. The
Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a
new trial since the amendment had set forth a new cause of action.
The court recognized the inability of the plaintiff to controvert
successfully the defendant's evidence, so the plaintiff would be
required to start a new action even after he had successfully proved
his right to recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
in the first action.37
Hayes v. Cedar Grove,38 decided only a few years ago, is equally
illustrative. In this case the plaintiff, while employed by a mu-
nicipal corporation, was injured by falling from a truck used in
removing garbage from the streets. He sought to recover damages,
basing his action upon alleged negligence in respect to the character
of the truck so used and the manner in which it was operated. A
demurrer to the declaration having been sustained on the basis
of the defendant's governmental immunity, the plaintiff was
34 76 W. Va. 747, 87 S.E. 198 (1915).
', The West Virginia court has recognized that its action in the Findley
case amounted to a denial of justice. In referring to the remand of the
case after holding that the amendment changed the cause of action, the
court in a later case said, "This in fact amounted to a denial of any relief
to plaintiff." Shaffer v. Western Maryland Ry., 93 W. Va. 300, 304, 116 S.E.
747, 749 (1923). Nevertheless, the court continues to rely heavily upon the
Findley case in refusing to permit an amendment which would change the
theory of law upon which the pleader seeks to recover. See Hayes v. Cedar
Grove, 128 W. Va. 590, 596, 37 S.E.2d 450, 453 (1946). But cf. Buffa v.
Baumgartner, 58 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1950).
38 128 W. Va. 590, 37 S.E.2d 450 (1946).
9
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allowed to amend the declaration by inserting language to allege
a cause of action under a state statute imposing liability on mu-
nicipal corporations where injury results from a failure to keep its
streets in a safe condition. This inserted language was later
deleted by the trial court on the basis that the amendment consti-
tuted a new cause of action. The Supreme Court of Appeals
agreed.
In both of these cases considerable time had elapsed between
the date the injury occurred and the time the case was decided,
both cases having previously been before the appellate court,,
Even with the possibility, but little probability, of being allowed an
additional year to start another action.40 the new action would
involve delay and added expense, not to mention the possibility
of loss of evidence.
39 In the Findley case the injury had occurred on October 30, 1909
[Findley v. Coal & Coke Ry., 72 W. Va. 268, 78 S.E. 396 (1913)], and the case
was finally decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals on October 12, 1915
[Findley v. Coal & Coke Ry., 76 W. Va. 747, 87 S.E. 198 (1915)]. In the Hayes
case the injury had occurred in May, 1943 [Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va.
828, 30 S.E.2d 726 (1944)], and the case was finally decided by the Supreme
Court of Appeals on March 12, 1946 [Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 128 W. Va. 590,
37 S.E.2d 450 (1946)].
40 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 2, § 18 (Michie, 1949) provides, inter alia,
that if, in an action commenced within due time, judgment for the plaintiff
should be arrested or reversed on a ground which does not preclude a new
action for the same cause, or if there be occasion to bring a new action
by reason of such cause having been dismissed for any cause which could not be
pleaded in bar of an action, the action may be brought within one year
after such arrest or reversal of judgment or after such dismissal, but not
thereafter. This year is allowed even though the time has expired within
which a new action would otherwise need to be brought.
However, the court has uniformly held that this statute does not suspend
the running of the statute of limitations if an action is dismissed by the
voluntary act of the plaintiff or conduct equivalent thereto. See McClung
v. Tieche, 126 W. Va. 575, 29 S.E.2d 250 (1944) and the cases cited therein.
Although no case has been found in which the plaintiff dismissed an action
and started another in order to assert a claim which was not permitted in
the former by amendment since it would change the cause of action, this
appears clearly to be a voluntary dismissal so far as the claim originally as-
serted is concerned and the statute does not purport to suspend the running
of the statute of limitations as to a cause which has never been asserted in
an action. The right to amend having been denied because the amended
declaration asserted a different cause of action from that originally stated, the
same reasoning should bar another action on the clalm after the statute of
limitations has run.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff misjoins causes of action in his original
declaration, he is permitted to amend the declaration to drop either group
of misjoined causes. See cases cited in notes 33 and 34 supra. In addition,
since the dropping of such causes was involuntary, being made necessary by
court action, and having been asserted in one action, the statute permits
such causes to be asserted within one year after the action is dismissed as
10
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E. Avoiding the Limitation
Before examining the reasons given for not allowing an amend-
ment which changes the cause of action, a case that shows how to
avoid the difficulty may be examined to determine whether the
procedure therein is more commendable than allowing greater
freedom in making amendments. Is the procedure therein neces-
sary in order to protect the defendant from inequities?
Shaffer v. Western Maryland Ry. 41 will be used to show how
the plaintiff may avoid a new action, since that case involves the
same basic problem as the Findley case. The plaintiff received
injuries in the service of the defendant and sued for the damages
sustained. In his declaration he combined three counts, one on
common law liability for negligence, a second based on defendant's
liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and a third
as an elaboration of the second count. The court held that there
was no misjoinder of counts. In allowing this joinder the court
made some observations which ought to be kept equally in mind
in considering a liberalization of the existing rules on amendments.
They seem worth noting at length:
" .. There is not in this case such an inherent difference
between the cause of action arising under the common or state
law and the cause of action arising under the Federal statute
as will prevent their joinder in the same declaration. Whether
the cause arises under the one or the other, it is based on the
defendant's negligence. . . . But it is frequently impossible
in advance of trial, in such cases, to determine whether the
injured employee was engaged in intra-state or inter-state
commerce at the time of the injury. . . . To permit this
[joining counts stating a cause of action under the federal
statute with counts stating a cause of action under the state
statute or common law], cheapens and greatly shortens litiga-
to these causes. Siever v. Klotts Throwing Co., 101 W. Va. 457, 132 S.E. 882
(1926). Thus, another reason for prolixity in pleading arises. See discussion
in text at pages 34 supra and 37-38 infra.
Any doubt that may exist as to the application of the statute on the asser-
tion in a new action of a claim which was not permitted by amendment, since
it was deemed a different cause, disappears in cases similar to the Findley
case. The statute does not extend the time for a new action for death by
wrongful act where that right is given under the state statute. Smith v.
Eureka Pipe Line Co., 122 W. Va. 277, 8 S.E.2d 890 (1940). Nor does the
saving statute apply to contractual limitations. Duncan v. Federal Union
Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 219, 171 S.E. 418 (1933).
41 93 W. Va. 300, 116 S.E. 747 (1923).
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tion, frequently prevents injustice to the plaintiff, and in no
sense deprives the defendant of any just right of defense.... 4 .
The justice in permitting some pleading device to be used to
avoid a second action and trial in these cases seems evident." The
question raised here is why should not an amendment be allowed
rather than initially cluttering the record with a great amount of
pleading that the pleader may never need? In addition, existing
limitations on joinder of causes of action prevent a pleader from
using multiple counts to meet many possible variances.4 4  What
then have been the reasons given by the court for not permitting
an amendment which changes "the cause of action"?
F. Reasons Given for the Limitation
In the Snyder case, the first in which an amendment was not
permitted under this rule,45 the court was concerned only with the
basic guiding principle which remains in the present statute,
namely, whether substantial justice would be promoted by the
amendment.*" This case established the necessity of the de-
fendant's objecting to prevent an amendment changing the cause
of action; 47 but the court also took the position that if the de-
42 Id. at 806-307, 116 S.E. at 749.
43 In other cases the court seems to have implied that even though the
amendment to assert an additional claim or a different theory of recovery
would not be permitted, the pleader might have originally asserted in a
separate count what he desired to do by amendment. Hayes v. Cedar Grove,
128 W. Va. 590, 597, 37 S.E.2d 450, 454; Snyder v. Harper, 24 W. Va. 206,
211 (1884). The breadth of permitted joinder of counts in West Virginia by
virtue of statutory modifications in the forms of action which are main-
tainable has been discussed in a prior issue of this Review. Lugar, supra
note 1.
44 The restrictions which now exist to prevent a pleader from originally
stating his claims so that every possible contingency at trial may be met in
his pleadings have been criticized in a prior issue of this Review. Lugar, supra
note 1. The importance of a liberalization in those rules is emphasized by
a rule as to amendments which is even more restrictive.
45 Per Judge Green, in Snyder v. Harper, 24 W. Va. 206, 211 (1884):
"There are no decisions, that I know of, in Virginia or in West Virginia
indicating what amendments the court can properly allow to be made to
a declaration after the appearance of the defendant." See, however, Hart v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 6 W. Va. 836, 341 (1873).
46 "The plaintiff may of right amend his declaration or bill at any time
before the appearance of the defendant, or after such appearance if substantial
justice will be promoted thereby." W. Va. Acts c. 71 (1882). Italics supplied.
47 No further reference will generally be made in the cases discussed
herein to the defendant's having objected to the amendment; it will be
understood that this action was taken.
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fendant objected, the court would conclude that he would be
injured by the amendment and that substantial justice could not
therefore be said to have been promoted. The court said there
were many ways in which the defendant might be injured and the
court had no way of knowing whether he would be injured. In
other words, a mere objection without any showing of actual preju-
dice would suffice.48  The court indicated only one possible injury,
namely, the plaintiff might have been defeated on his original
cause of action but succeed on the new cause of action, subjecting
the defendant to payment of the entire costs of the action.49 Would
riot this consideration be present even though the cause of action
were not changed by the amendment? The reason given for not
allowing the amendment is not impressive. If the defendant would
be injured by the change, why should he not be required to show
in what way he will be injured? The court has the power to impose
such terms on the allowing of the amendment as are just, including
charging to the plaintiff the costs of the proceeding to the stage at
which the amendment is made.50
In none of the other cases in which the court has refused to
allow an amendment has the reasoning in this early case been
used expressly. However, the court seems to have been influenced
in some later decisions by considering whether the defendant
would be liable under both the original and the amended declara-
48 Note that the federal rule requires the objecting party to show actual
prejudice. See text at page 61 infra.
49 In addition to naming this one possible injury, the court merely added
this statement: "There are many other ways, in which the defendant might
be injured by such an amendment; and as the court has no possible means of
knowing whether the defendant will or will not be injured, if he objects
to such amendment of the declaration, the court ought not to allow it, as it is
clear in such a case, that the court cannot say in the language of our statute
'substantial justice will be promoted thereby.' " 24 W. Va. 206, 213 (1884).
ro The present statute provides that the court may permit a pleading to
be amended "upon such terms as it may deem just". W. VA. CODE c. 56, art.
4, § 24 (Michie, 1949). When the Snyder case was decided, the statute
merely provided that the court might impose such terms upon the plaintiff
as to a continuance of the cause, and the payment of the costs of such
continuance, as it might deem just. WV. Va. Acts c. 71 (1882). The statute
then provided and now provides that where a continuance of the cause is
granted because of an amendment, the continuance shall be at the cost of
the party making the amendment. These differences exist: the former statute
contained this provision only as to amendments to cure variances between the
pleading and proof; whereas the present statute applies generally to any
amendment of a pleading which results in a continuance to a subsequent
term. Compare IV. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 28 (Michie, 1949) with W. Va.
Acts c. 120 (1882).
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tion. There seems to be an inarticulate assumption that the
amendment should not be allowed if it would result in a different
party being liable for the costs of the proceeding.
In Greasy v. Thomasr' the plaintiff sued a husband and wife
for wrongful death caused by negligent operation by the wife of
an automobile belonging to the husband and used by him and
other members of the family for family purposes. The liability
was apparently asserted against the husband on the family-car
doctrine.5 2 The plaintiff was permitted to amend his declaration
to allege that the automobile was owned by a third person. With-
out citing any case to support its conclusion, the court held that
the amendment did not introduce a new cause of action, saying:
...... The plaintiff would have been entitled to recover
under the original declaration, on the ground that the husband
was responsible for the wife's tort, whether he or another was
the owner of the automobile. ... ,53
Perhaps a more striking, illustration of this approach is found
in Dempsey v. Poore,5 4 wherein the plaintiff was permitted to
amend his declaration which had alleged a joint promise by the
two defendants to allege that the promise had been made by four
persons, the other two of whom had died before the action was
brought. No new cause of action was involved, for, inter alia: ".....
The death of one joint promisor does not release the surviving
promisors."r5
In Kuhn v. Brownfield,- the plaintiff in an action of assumpsit
alleged that the defendant doctor promised to treat his injury in
a proper manner and to cure the injury. The declaration was
amended to delete the words referring to any express contract to
cure the plaintiff, leaving in the declaration an action based on
51 106 W. Va. 24, 144 S.E. 563 (1928).
52 The family purpose doctrine as to automobiles had been recognized
in West Virginia in Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S.E. 828 (1922). Wyant
v. Phillips, 116 W. Va. 207, 179 S.E. 303 (1935), held that the doctrine applied
even to impose liability on a wife, who owned the automobile, for the negligent
operation thereof by the husband. The West Virginia cases in which the
doctrine has been applied are cited in Buffa v. Baumgartner, 58 S.E.2d 270
(W. Va. 1950).
53 106 W. Va. at 26, 144 S.E. at 564. The husband is no longer liable
for his wife's "tortious acts unless they were done as his 'agent or by his
actual coercion or instigation. W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 3, § 20 (Michie, 1949).
See note 52 supra as to the family car doctrine.
54 75 W. Va. 107, 83 S.E. 300 (1914).
55 Id. at 108, 83 S.E. at 301. -
58 34 W. Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890).
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the implied obligation to exercise reasonable skill. It was held
that no change in the cause of action had been made, for the de-
fendant was charged with negligence and omission to use care
under both the original and amended declarations.5 7
The Kuhn case is introduced here to indicate that perhaps
the writer has been too much impressed with the idea that in some
cases the court has been influenced by consideration of liability for
costs. Perhaps the court has been thinking only of a difference in
the duty existing on the changed allegations as related to possible
defenses the defendant might make. This factor has been im-
portant in many cases, which will be discussed, but it should be
noted that in the Kuhn case there was a change from absolute
liability to one for negligence. 58 The writer believes therefore that
the above cases indicate a greater concern in a change in the
liability for costs than in the need for different evidence to establish
a defense, remembering that the latter may be directly related to
the former.
That both factors may be combined in the same case is illus-
trated by the Hayes case,59 wherein the plaintiff sought to amend
his declaration charging common law negligence to one asserting
statutory liability against the municipal corporation. The change
would more likely have made the defendant liable,60 but in addi-
tion different evidence would have been necessary to establish a
defense.
The refusal to allow an amendment because there may be a
difference as to which party is held liable for costs has been criti-
cized.1 Should an amendment be refused because the defendant
may need different evidence to establish his defense? Any amend-
ment may involve surprise to the defendant, and it may be unfair
57 This is a paraphrase of the court's statement that the gist of the
action in the declaration, both before and after the amendment, was the
defendant's "negligence and omission to exercise skill, judgment and care."
Id. at 257, 12 S.E. at 521.
Gs The court seems to have recognized this difference in the duty alleged
before and after amendment, but said that the question was not what duties
the defendant assumed but whether an act or transaction different from that
specified in the declaration had been alleged in the amendment. Ibid.
59 Supra note 38.
Go The court had held on the facts originally alleged that the defendant
town was not liable for the acts there being performed in carrying out a
governmental function. Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d
726 (1944).
61 See text at page 39 supra.
15
Lugar: Common Law Pleading Modified Versus the Federal Rules: II. Amendm
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1950
COMMON LAW PLEADING
to require him to submit his case without additional time for
preparation, but this is true whether or not the amendment in-
volves a change in the cause of action.62  The question of his right
to a continuance should be a separate question, although there are
dicta in West Virginia cases that the defendant is entitled to a con-
tinuance whenever any amendment is allowed.03 That dicta has
been rejected, and the defendant is now required to show good
cause for a continuance after an amendment is allowed.04  How-
ever, the effect of the West Virginia rule preventing a change in
the cause of action by amendment is to separate certain cases in
which the defendant need not show any reason for a continuance.
It a new cause would be introduced by the amendment, the de-
fendant by merely objecting to the change obtains a continuance
in effect by requiring the plaintiff to start a new action to assert
the claim. Do the cases indicate any line of distinction between
these classes of cases which can be justified on the basis of fairness
to the defendant? In attempting to answer this question any incon-
sistency between the treatment given in different cases will be
noted.
6z For example, in the following cases the court held that the amendment
did not involve a change in the cause of action, yet the defendant might
well need additional time to prepare for his defense. Morrison v. Judy, 123
W. Va. 200, 13 S.E.2d 751 (1941) (action changed from one on a renewal
note to one on the original note); Bartley v. Western Maryland Ry., 81
W. Va. 795, 95 S.E. 443 (1918) (action based on failure to stop the train at a station
changed to one based on a sudden starting of the train after it had stopped);
Staats v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 57 W. Va. 571, 50 S.E. 815 (1905) (action
on one insurance policy changed to action on another policy); Clarke v.
Ohio River R.R., 39 W. Va. 732, 20 S.E. 696 (1894) (action for failure to
build certain structures changed to one for failure to build those structures
at different places).
63 . . . the circuit courts . . . may in their discretion permit the
pleadings to be amended .. .; but in every such case if the opposite party
requests it the jury should be discharged, the opposite party allowed to
amend his pleadings or to plead anew to the pleadings so amended, and the
cause continued." Travis v. Peabody Ins. Co., 28 W. Va. 583, 595 (1886). Italics
supplied. See also dictum in point 9 of syllabus to Lawson v. Williamson
Coal & Coke Co., 61 W. Va. 669, 57 S.E. 258 (1907).
64 The dictum was expressly rejected in Koen v. Fairmont Brewing Co.,
69 W. Va. 94, 70 S.E. 1098 (1911), and impliedly rejected, without citation
of authority, in Adams v. Adams, 79 W. Va. 546, 92 S.E. 463 (1917). That
the defendant must show that a continuance is necessary to enable him to
make his defense was affirmed in Pancake v. Hite, 105 W. Va. 366, 142 S.E. 518
(1928). The statute expressly provides that the trial of an action at law
shall not be continued to another term because of an amendment unless the
defendant satisfies the court that because of the amendment he cannot
safely proceed with the trial without the continuance. In addition, it pro-
vides that wherever a substantial amendment of any pleading is made, the
court shall enter such order as to continuance as shall appear "fair and just".
W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 28 (Michie, 1949).
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G. Application of the Rule to Subject Matter
Several cases alrevzIy mentioned offer an interesting compari-
son in the application of the rule. In the Findley case 65 the amend-
ment was not allowed when the plaintiff sought thereby to recover
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act rather than under the
state statute. Under either declaration the plaintiff was seeking
the same relief, namely, damages for a death by the wrongful act
of the defendant, and the defendant's duty under each was the
same, namely, to refrain from wrongful or negligent acts causing
injury or death to the employee.66 The differences stressed by the
court were the origin of the duties and the variance in the extent of
obligation involved in each. Yet in the Kuhn case 67 the court
permitted an amendment which changed the declaration from one
on an express contract to one on an implied contract, the former
imposing absolute liability and the latter liability only for negli-
gence. Were not the duties of different origin and the extent of
the obligation different? Would not the following test, applied in
the Kuhn case, have produced a different result if applied in the
Findley case?
"Here the question is not exactly how the surgeon was
engaged, or what duties he assumed, but it is whether the
wrongful act charged in the declaration, as amended, as the
cause of the plaintiff's damage, is a different act from that
specified in the declaration before amended .... Whether he
engaged by special contract to cure or by implied contract to
use ordinary skill, the wrongful act charged against him .. .
would be a violation both of such special and implied under-
takings .. ."08
Clearly there was no question of the defendant's being sur-
prised by the amendment in the Findley case; contrariwise, it was
the evidence which was introduced by the defendant which sur-
prised the plaintiff and made the amendment necessary. Assume,
65 Supra note 36.
66 The similarity was recognized by the court. It is stated this way in
the opinion: "The state statute giving a right of action for damages for
death by wrongful act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, giving a
right of action for the same thing, each impliedly imposes duty upon the
employer, to refrain from wrongful or negligent acts causing injury or death
to the employee. This duty is, in a sense, the same under each act. It is
the duty to exercise care for the protection of the servant from injury and
death, while engaged in the performance of his work." 76 W. Va. 747, 752,
87 S.E. 198, 201.
67 Supra note 56.
68 34 W. Va. 252, 257, 12 S.E. 519, 521.
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however, that the amendment is the type which might surprise the
defendant and therefore ought not to be allowed, accepting for this
purpose the reasoning of the court in the Snyder case, which has
already been criticized 9 Is that the basis on which the amend-
ment was not allowed in the Findley case? If so, the case stands
in contrast with Lawson v. Williamson Coal & Coke Co.7 0 Here
the plaintiffs declaration contained common counts in assumpsit,
but none of those used suggested or indicated that any evidence
to sustain a claim for rent or use and occupancy of land would be
introduced.7 1 Nevertheless, after the introduction of such evidence
and the submission of the case, the plaintiff was permitted, over the
objection of the defendant, to amend his declaration to add a
special count stating a cause of action on a contract of lease. The
court, not even considering whether this amounted to a change
in the cause of action, merely relied on an earlier case which had
allowed an amendment. In the Mankin caseT2 decided soon there-
after, the court took the position that a change in the cause of
action would be involved if the plaintiff amended his declaration
to insert a special count on an additional claim that would not
have been provable under any of the common counts in the
original declaration. The writer is unable to distinguish the
cases, 7 3 yet in the one the amendment is permitted but is not
allowed in the other. If possible surprise to the defendant is the
basis of the decision in the Findley case, the court has not con-
sistently adhered to this test.
Perhaps the Findley case rests to a large degree on the idea
that the plaintiff should not be permitted to change the theory
of law on which he seeks to recover. In the Hayes case,7 4 recently
decided, the court relied heavily on this being the basis of the
Findley decision. In both cases the court cited in support of its
69 See text at page 39 supra.
70 61 W. Va. 669, 57 S.E. 258 (1907).
71 That the defendant might have been surprised seems to have been
fully considered by the court, for it is expressly stated: "None of the common
counts suggested or indicated that any evidence to sustain a claim for rent
or use and occupancy of land would be introduced .... The common counts
set forth in this declaration did not indicate that any evidence of the kind
adduced would be offered. On the contrary, they stated facts which indicated
reliance upon entirely different kinds of evidence." 61 W. Va. 669, 680, 57 S.E.
258, 262.
72 Supra note 20.
73 It is true that in the Lawson case the original declaration had con-
tained a special count on the contract, but a demurrer thereto had been sus-
tained. When the case was set for trial only the common counts were available.
74 Supra note 88.
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position the now discredited case of Union Pacific Ry. v. Wyler,75
which refused to permit an amendment to change the cause of
action "from law to law". The Wyler case involved changing the
basis of the claim for damages from the common law to a state
statute, and in this respect is parallel with the Hayes case.
Aside from the question whether a change "from law to law"
should be deemed a change in the cause of action even under
common law pleading,76 which is a system of pleading ultimate
facts and not law, the writer has had some difficulty finding any
West Virginia decision inconsistent in this respect with the Hayes
75 158 U.S. 285 (1895). The case most often cited to show that the
Supreme Court has limited and perhaps in effect overruled the Wyler case is
Missouri, K. 8- T. Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570 (1913). In the Findley case,
the West Virginia court attempted to reconcile the Wulf case with the
Wyler case by saying that the former had involved t petition setting forth
facts which brought the case within the federal statute and was amended
only as to the capacity in which the plaintiff sued. The court seems to
have ignored the allegation of the original petition in the Wulf case, "That
by virtue of the laws of the State of Kansas, where the said Fred S. Wulf
was killed, a right of action is provided by statute, for injuries resulting in
death." Id. at 572. An amendment to assert that the defendant was liable
under the Acts of Congress of the United States was held not to change
the cause of action on the basis that the court was presumed to be
cognizant of the enactment of the federal act and to know that on the facts
alleged the state law had been superseded by the federal act. The attempt
to distinguish the Wyler case on this basis has been criticized as meaning
"little more than this: if the first legal theory is wholly fallacious then the
plaintiff may change to another, while if he is not so fortunate as to have
been terribly wrong at first he may not change." 3 MooRE, FEERAL PRACTrcE
818 (2d ed. 1948). In the Wulf case the court stressed that the amendment
did not set up any different state of facts; but in the Wyler case the court
had taken the position that such would only prevent a change in the cause
of action from "fact to fact" and would not protect against a change from
"law to law". Among the later Supreme Court decisions discrediting the
Wyler case are Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938) and United
States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62 (1933). See also the dis-
cussion of the Wyler case in CLARK, CODE: PLEADING 719 and in 3 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRAMCE 818.
76 Some support for the rule might be found under the common law
system which generally regarded a change even in the form of action as a
change in the cause of action. See text at page 31 supra. Such changes were
regarded as attempts to recover under a different theory of law. Judge
Clark, in referring to the rule that an amendment which changed the form
of action was not allowed, says, "The test often stated was: Did the pro-
posed amendment change the action 'from law to law'?" CLARK, CODE PLEADING
717. See also HEPBuRN, TiE HIsTORicAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING
305 (1897).
However, the West Virginia statute expressly provides that a change in
the form of action shall not prevent the allowance of an amendment. See
statute quoted in the text at page 28 supra. Implicit within this provision would
seem to be the idea that an action should not be defeated where the qmend-
ment offered would not change any of the material facts of the claim but
merely the legal theory upon which recovery is sought.
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and Findley cases,"7 unless there could be included those cases in
which the plaintiff has alleged an ultimate fact improperly through
misapplication of the law involved. To the writer the degree of
difference between the two classes of cases does not seem great
since either involves the application of different law by an amend-
ment to permit recovery. These cases will be discussed anon.7 8
Only one West Virginia case casts some doubt, and that is very
small, on the inability of the plaintiff to shift from common law
to statutory liability, or vice versa, or from liability under one
statute to liability under another. That case is Twyman v. Monon-
gahela West Penn Public Service Co.,7 9 which did not really involve
a shift of the nature here discussed, but the plaintiff was permitted
to amend his declaration so that a municipal ordinance might be
introduced in evidence. The parties contended that the ordinance
had some relation to the question of liability in the case. Presum-
ably the plaintiff wanted to prove negligence against the defendant
by showing a violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of
injury.80 The court merely says that the trial court has a wide
discretion in permitting amendments under the statute.
Several West Virginia cases have been liberal in allowing
amendments where the plaintiff has alleged improperly the ulti-
mate facts in his declaration through a misapplication of the law
involved. The plaintiff was permitted to amend his declaration
to charge that the note sued on was the joint note of the defendants
instead of joint and several as charged in the original declara-
tion."' The court refused to follow a federal case which treated
such change as one in the cause of action -.8 2 In another case the
77 In several cases where amendments have been allowed, the court has
been careful to point out that there was no change from "law to law". E.g.,
Roberts v. United Fuel Gas Co., 84 W. Va. 368, 371, 99 S.E. 549, 550 (1919);
Bartley v. Western Maryland Ry., 81 W. Va. 795, 797, 95 S.E. 443, 444 (1918).
Compare these cases with Buffa v. Baumgartner, 58 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1950),
in which an amendment was permitted that would allow recovery even
though the automobile causing the death was operated by a person other than
the one originally alleged. Here, as in the Findley case, the plaintiff was
surprised when the defendant introduced evidence that a fact was different
from that originally alleged. But, the amendment was not allowed in the
Findley case.
78 The cases are discussed in the second following paragraph in the
text.
79 118 W. Va. 330, 191 S.E. 541 (1937).
80 Jones v. Virginian Ry., 115 W. Va. 665, 177 S.E. 621 (1934).
81 National Bank of Weston v. Lynch, 69 W. Va. 333, 71 S.E. 389 (1911).
82 The court does stress the fact that in the federal case the amendment
was offered during the trial, whereas the amendment was here offered before
trial. However, the court then points out that the West Virginia statute
authorizes such amendments even in the midst of trial.
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plaintiff was permitted to change the assertion that the defendant
was liable on the note as an endorser to charge that he was liable
as a co-obligor8 3 Without giving a reason, the court merely stated
that there was no change in the cause of action.
Another case also stands in sharp contrast with the Findley
and Hayes cases. In both of these cases the plaintiff was seeking
to recover the same thing in the original and amended declarations,
namely, damages for the same injury, whether under one theory of
law or another, yet the court was not influenced by this considera-
tion. However, in Morrison v. Judy,8 4 a recent case, the court per-
mitted the plaintiff to change his action from one on a renewal
note to one based on the original note, saying,
.... we are of the opinion that the identity of the cause
of action has been clearly maintained throughout this litiga-
tion. What the bank's receiver sought in the first instance
was to recover the money loaned. ... No new cause of action
was set up. There was only an effort to adjust the pleading
to the evidence which could be produced bearing upon the
liability of the defendant ... "1,5
Essentially the same might have been said of the amendments
which were not permitted in the Findley and Hayes cases. This
case also permits an amendment to insert facts which could have
been the basis of another action, which would seem improper by
other cases. 0
An equally pertinent statement of the Supreme Court of the
United States, made prior to the effective date of the Federal Rules,
might be used in criticism of the Findley and Hayes cases. Mr.
Justice Black, writing the opinion, said:8 7
"Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving
at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants.
They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement
of that end. .. . Proper pleading is important, but its im-
portance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish
the end of a just judgment. The effect of the amendment
here was to facilitate a fair trial of the existing issues between
plaintiff and defendant."
83 Brown v. Cook, 77 W. Va. 356, 87 S.E. 454 (1915).
84 123 W. Va. 200, 13 S.E.2d 751 (1941). To the game effect see Ritchie
County Bank v. Richie, 62 W. Va. 457, 461, 59 S.E. 181, 183 (1907).
85 123 W. Va. 200, 204, 13 S.E.2d 751, 753. Compare the statutory
provision which permits the plaintiff to sue on the original cause of action
and then, in answer to a plea of the statute of limitations, by replication to
state a promise which annulled the prior effect of the statute of limitations.
W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 2, § 8 (Michie, 1949).
s0 See note 29 supra.
87 Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197, 200 (1938).
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Inconsistency also appears in cases dealing with the assertion
of additional claims arising out of the same transaction. In the
Snyder case88 the court had refused to allow the addition of a claim
for taking and carrying away personal property where the declara-
tion originally included a claim only for the personal injury done.
However, in Mulvay v. Hanes,0 the original declaration contained
only one count which was for the loss of services of the plaintiff's
wife alleged to be due to fright caused by the defendant in a per-
sonal combat between the plaintiff and him in her presence. The
lower court refused to permit the plaintiff to amend to add a count
averring that in the encounter the defendant struck the plaintiffs
wife thereby causing the injury. The Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed the ruling as manifestly erroneous. The court stated that
both counts based the right of recovery upon injuries "arising out
of the same transaction", the amendment presenting only a new
element of the same "general cause of action". The court went
further to state generally that the plaintiff could, as grounds of
recovery, aver and prove any fright or physical injury traceable
to the assault. Under the West Virginia procedure separate counts
are treated as distinct causes of action whether inserted to meet
variable phases of the evidence or to recover for different injuries.00
Accordingly, these cases reach inconsistent results.0 1
A later case seems to support the Mulvay case rather than the
Snyder case, and it dearly involves the insertion of an additional
claim. In Elkhorn Sand & Supply Co. v. Algonquin Coal Co.,92 a
notice of motion for judgment alleged that money was due and
owing to the plaintiff for sand previously sold and delivered to the
defendant. During the trial it appeared that the plaintiff's claim
consisted of the price of three cars of sand and a much larger item
88 Supra note 19. To the same effect see Mankin v. Jones, 68 W. Va.
442, 69 S.E. 981 (1910).
89 76 W. Va. 721, 86 S.E. 758 (1915).
90 BuRKs, PLEADING 8, PRACTICE 895; SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING § 79.
91 This distinction might be drawn: the Mulvay case seems to involve
an amendment to meet a possible variance in the proof, whereas the
Snyder case seems to have involved an amendment to assert an additional
claim. The court does not make this distinction, and it would be difficult
before trial to determine whether the amendment was desired for one pur-
pose or the other. The court seems never to have drawn a distinction be-
tween what will amount to a change in the cause of action before trial as
contrasted with a change in the cause at trial. The cases deciding what
amounts to a change in the cause are cited interchangeably whether the
question involves an amendment at one time or the other. See also the
discussion of the Elkhorn Sand & Supply Co. case which involved the as-
sertion of an additional claim by amendment. See text above.
09 103 W. Va. 110, 136 S.E. 783 (1927).
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for prepaid freight on the cars of sand. The plaintiff was per-
mitted to amend his notice to include the freight item, since,
quoting the court:
"The amendment did not introduce any new cause of
action, but only items not mentioned in the notice, which
were closely connected with the item stated therein. . . . If
the defendant conceived itself to be aggrieved or prejudiced
by the amendment, it could have moved for a continuance, as
provided by the statute. . ... 93
The court does not purport to apply a different rule where an
amendment is made in a notice of motion for judgment rather
than in an action at law, and the statute provides that in neither
type of proceeding shall the cause of action be changed.94 The
court's approach in these two later cases seems to be in the right
direction, as will be discussed presently. They are used here only
for the purpose of contrast with other decisions which have never
been questioned by the court and which continue to serve as
precedents for narrow limits on amendments in the plaintiff's
pleading.
Additional claims may be asserted also by amendments if the
concept of a cause of action is broadened. Those cases have been
discussed which held that an amendment could not be made if the
hew facts could have been the basis of another action.95 The con-
verse of this principle has been used to justify allowing an amend-
03 Id. at 113, 136 S.E. at 784. Compare also Shires v. Boggess, 72 W. Va.
109, 77 S.E. 542 (1913), with Mankin v. Jones, 68 W. Va. 422, 69 S.E. 981
(1910). In the Shires case the plaintiff was permitted to amend her declar-
ation by inserting therein in two blank spaces the figures "$50.00" covering
amounts expended by her for different purposes as a result of the defendant's
alleged assault. The court did not discuss whether there was a change in
the cause of action, being satisfied that substantial justice would be pro-
moted by the amendment and having found one case from another juris-
diction which permitted a declaration to be amended by filling blanks. In
the Mankin case, in allowing an amendment to add a special count applicable
to an item provable under the original common counts, the court held that
this was not a departure from the original cause if the amount of damages
claimed in both the original and amended declaration remained the same.
Compare, however, with the Mankin case, Larzo v. Swift g- Co., 129 W. Va.
436, 442, 40 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1946), where the court says that the amend-
ment allowed only "added elements of damages". Increasing the damages
by amendment does not change the cause of action. Merrill v. Marietta
Torpedo Co., 79 W. Va. 669, 92 S.E. 112 (1917).
94 In Morrison v. Judy, 125 W. Va. 200, 13 S.E.2d 751 (1941), the court
held that W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 24 (quoted in part in the text at
page 28 supra), permits an amendment to a notice of motion for judgment as
long as the cause of action set out in the original notice is not changed. It
may be noticed in this opinion that the court relies upon cases involving
actions at law to determine whether the cause of action was changed.
05, See text at page 35 supra.
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ment. In Clarke v. Ohio River R.R.,96 a landowner sued to recover
damages for failure of the defendant to build fences, cattle guards,
and farm crossings on land which it had condemned. An amend-
ment in the declaration was permitted to charge failure to build
these structures at points on the land different from those specified
in the original declaration. The court allowed the amendment on
the basis that any of these omissions would be breaches of the same
duty and only one cause of action would be involved, saying,
"... we consider the failure to comply with its duty by
the company.., as the cause of action, and not the failure as
to each crossing separately and distinctly. I think he is bound
to amend, or else ever lose damages for failures not included in
the declaration; for a person cannot split one cause of action
into several suits. . ...07
If an amendment may be made to add claims which would
otherwise be lost because of the rule against "splitting a cause
of action", the court need only broaden its concept of the cause of
action to permit an amendment which would not be allowed under
those cases which do not permit an amendment to insert that which
might be the basis of another action. This is precisely what the
court did in the recent case of Larzo v. Swift & Co. 8 The plaintiff
sued to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile collision. She was permitted to amend her declaration to
add a claim for damages to her automobile. An earlier case had
held that on the facts in this case claims for personal injuries and
for property damage might be joinedW9 but in this case the court
went further to support the amendment, stating:
.... A plaintiff who has sustained personal injuries and
property damage in an automobile collision has but a single
cause of action and the elements of damages, consisting of
injury to the person and property of plaintiff, must be joined
in the same action. ... The cause of action is the negligent
act and not the resulting damages .... " 100
The court could not rely on the earlier case permitting joinder of
such claims, for merely being joinable would not prevent the
9( 39 W. Va. 732, 20 S.E. 696 (1894).
97 Id. at 738, 20 S.E. at 698.
98 129 W. Va. 436, 40 S.E.2d 811 (1946), 51 W. Va. L.Q. 71 (1948).
99Thalman v. Schultze, 111 W. Va. 64, 160 S.E. 303 (1931). For a more
detailed discussion of joinder of causes of action, see Lugar, supra note 1.
100 129 V. Va. 436, 442, 40 S.E.2d 811, 814. Italics supplied. To support
this conclusion the court cited two cases from other jurisdictions, makisfg
reference to one West Virginia case, the Snyder cae, as "touhing the
liberality of amendment of a declaration." For a criticism of the Snyder
case, see the text at page 38 supra.
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added claim from being a new cause of action.101 Only by holding
that the claims or "elements of damages" must be joined could the
amendment be allowed without overruling other cases.
H. Application of the Rule to Parties
Aside from the question of amendments relating to the subject
matter of the action, courts have been faced with the problem of
allowing amendments to change the parties to the action. This
problem was previously raised in the discussion of misjoinder and
nonjoinder of parties. It was there noted that parties may be
added or dropped by amendment to cure a nonjoinder or mis-
joinder of parties plaintiff or defendant.10 2 However, the West
Virginia court has refused to sanction the substitution of parties
under the statute permitting amendments to cure misjoinder and
nonjoinder of parties.103 The question arises here whether the
parties may be changed under the provisions of other statutes. One
'West Virginia statute permits the correct name to be inserted in the
declaration and summons by an amendment in any case where a
misnomer appears. 04 The court has applied that statute liberally,
even allowing under it what might appear to be the insertion of a
party by amendment when there originally was no party plaintiff to
the action. ° However, the court has not purported to apply the
statute to permit any change in the cause of action. As the court
said in a case involving misnomer of the defendant:
..... The cause of action is the same in both pleadings.
... This is not a case where by amendment a different party
has been substituted for the defendant actually sued; but one
in which the name of the party actually sued and served with
process has been corrected ... "106
One case not involving misnomer merits consideration. In
that case the change introduced a cause of action legally and tech-
nically different from the legal import of the original declaration;
but since the pleader did not intend the legal import of the original
declaration to be different from that of the amended declaration,
101 See text at page 33 supra.
-102 See Lugar, supra, note 1.
103 Crook v. Ferguson, 123 W. Va. 490, 16 S.E.2d 620 (1941).
104 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 29 (Michie, 1949).
1o Kingman Mills v. Furner, 89 W. Va. 511, 109 S.E. 600 (1921), 28 W. Va.
L.Q. 241 (1922).
100 Duty v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 70 W. Va. 14, 19, 73 S.E. 331, 334
(1911). See also point 1 of the syllabus by the court to Corrick v. Western
Maryland Ry., 79 W. Va. 592, 91 S.E. 458 (1917).
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the amendment was allowed.10 7 The original declaration contained
allegations of personal promises by the defendant, whereas the
proof showed a claim against the estate represented by the defend-
ant as administrator; but the summons and declaration both de-
scribed the defendant as administrator, and the account filed with
the declaration containing the common counts showed that the
services for which the action was brought had been rendered to the
defendant's precedent. Here the court merely permitted the cause
of action to be asserted against the defendant in a different form
from that asserted in the first instance,108 and there is no indication
in the case that the pleading could have been amended to substitute
a different party. For the reason indicated in the case refusing to
allow substitution of parties by treating it as a case of misjoinder, 00
the court would probably hold that any amendment to substitute a
different party amounts to a change in the cause of action and as
such is not permitted.110
I. Limitations under Code Pleading"',
Free use of amendments has been hindered even in code states
by similar limitations placed on the right to amend. In some states
107 Hanson v. Blake, 63 W. Va. 560, 60 S.E. 589 (1908).
108 Compare the West Virginia court's attempt to distinguish the Wulf
case from the Wyler case in Findley v. Coal & Coke Ry., 76 W. Va. 747, 754,
87 S.E. 198, 201 (1915), where the court seems to agree with the proposition
that an amendment which merely changes the capacity in which the plain-
tiff sues does not change the cause of action. However, the view that a
change in pleading from "law to law" results in a change in the cause of
action would logically lead to the conclusion that a change in the capacity
in which a party sues or is sued results in a change in the cause of action.
N. & G. Taylor Co. v. Anderson, 14 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1926). ' For criticism
of view that a change in the legal theory results in a change in the cause,
see text at pages 43-47 supra.
109 "Where suit or action is brought by a party having no interest in
the subject matter, it is of no avail for any purpose." Crook v. Ferguson,
123 W. Va. 490, 491, 16 S.E.2d 620 (1941). It would seem to follow that any
amendment to show that another party has an interest in the subject
matter would be treated by the court as a new cause of action. See note 110
infra.
110 Other courts have taken this position. Hallett v. Larcom, 5 Idaho
492, 51 Pac. 108 (1897) (substituting another plaintiff); Third Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. v. White, 58 F.2d 411 (D. Mass. 1932) (substituting another de-
fendant). Although the federal rule on amendments will be discussed
presently in the text, it should be noted here that the trend under the
federal rule is to permit amendments involving a change in the capacity
of the parties or the substitution of different parties. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 832. See also CLARK, CODE PLEADING 711 n. 33.
111 Discussion here refers to the earlier rules of code pleading and not to
those codes which now contain provisions similar to those in the Federal
Rules.
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the limitations have been imposed by the courts, apparently without
regard to more liberal statutory provisions," 2 and in other states
the statutes have expressed a limitation.113 Often the statutory
limitation is that an amendment shall not change substantially the
claim or defense." 4 However, as a result of the influence of the
formulary system of the common law, the courts have treated this
limitation as meaning that there shall be no change in the "cause
of action."115 The statutes containing the restriction seem to impose
the limitation only on those amendments which conform the plead-
ings to the proof; and where the courts have imposed the limitation
without the aid of a statutory provision, they have shown a ten-
dency to restrict the amendment in this way only at that stage of
the proceeding, that is, at and after the trial. However, other
courts have imposed the limitation whenever the amendment is
offered." 0
The West Virginia practice therefore has not been very dif-
ferent from that which has existed in code states, the court having
applied the rule whenever the amendment was offered. One dif-
ference of interest is that the West Virginia court has shown no
112 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 716. Note the liberal language in the
statutes quoted in note 113 infra.
113 Statutes in the code states have one or the other of the following
provisions or slight variations thereof:
[1] "The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as
may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by
adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake
in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon
like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may like-
wise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon such
terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in
other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after
the time limited by this code.
[2] "The court may, at any time, in furtherance of justice, and on such
terms as may be proper, amend any pleadings or proceedings by adding or
striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the
name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect, or by inserting other
allegations material to the case; or, when the amendment does not change
substantially the claim or defense, by conforming the pleading or proceeding
to the facts proved." CLARK, CODE PLEADING 710. Judge Clark has set forth
in the footnotes to this quotation the jurisdictions having each type and the
citation to the statute of each state. The states having each type are approxi-
mately equally divided.
114 See the second paragraph of the quotation in note 113 supra. Amend-
ments to change defenses are discussed in the next section of the text.
115 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 717.
116 Id. at 716. The writer believes that in the eleventh line on the
page cited the words "before trial" were inadvertently used instead of "at
and after trial." See also PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING §§ 475, 477 (2d ed. 1932).
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tendency to be less liberal in allowing amendments offered at the
trial stage than if offered prior to the trial." 7
J. Liberal Treatment of Defendant
The above summary concerning code jurisdictions indicates
that in some states the defendant may not be permitted to change
substantially the nature of his defense by an amendment. How-
ever, the courts have generally allowed the defendant greater
liberality than they have the plaintiff, since the plaintiff can sue
again* if he has "another cause of action" whereas the defendant
must assert any defense that he has in the action brought against
him.118 The writer has been unable to find any authority on this
point concerning defenses at law in West Virginia, except several
early Virginia cases. The breadth of the general issue in most
actions at law makes an amendment unnecessary even though the
defendant in fact changes his originally intended defense after the
plaintiff has introduced his evidence. 1" 9 In any event, the early
Virginia cases indicate that even where an amendment in the
pleading is necessary, the defendant may set up a different defense
at law, even after issue has been joined on another plea, if it is an
honest and conscientious defense and the defendant has not been
117 In code states the courts are much less liberal in permitting amend-
ments after a case has reached the trial stage. CLARK, CODE PLEADING §
117. In six out of the seven cases found in which the question arose at the
trial stage, the West Virginia court allowed the amendment. The only
test applied is whether the amendment offered changed the "cause of action",
and whatever the meaning of that test may be, it seems to have the same
meaning whether applied before or at the trial. Of the seven cases mentioned,
the amendments were allowed in Elkhorn Sand & Supply Co. v. Algonquin
Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 110, 136 S.E. 783 (1927); National Bank of Weston
v. Lynch, 69 W. Va. 333, 71 S.E. 389 (1911); Hanson v. Blake, 63 W. Va. 560,
60 S.E. 589 (1908); Lawson v. Williamson Coal F, Coke Co., 61 W. Va. 669,
57 S.E. 258 (1907); Staats v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 57 W. Va. 571, 50 S.E. 815
(1905); and Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890); and was
not allowed in Findley v. Coal 9- Coke Ry., 76 V. Va. 747, 87 S.E. 198 (1915).
See also Buffa v. Baumgartner, 58 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va. 1950) where the amend-
ment was ullowed after presentation of defendant's evidence.
's Cartwright v. Ruffin, 43 Colo. 377, 96 Pac. 261 (1908); CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 723.
119 The question here involved may become more important if the ten-
dency of the West Virginia court to curtail the scope of the general issue
continues. Professor Carlin has demonstrated this tendency. Carlin, Recent
Developments in Local Procedure, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 165 (1941). With reference
to the requirement of special pleading as to the defenses discussed by Professor
Carlin, the reader's attention is invited to the similarity of Federal Rule 8 (c)
which provides that any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense must be affirmatively pleaded, specifically naming nineteen defenses
which must be thus pleaded. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
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guilty of laches.120  A similar liberal treatment accorded to the
defendant in equity by the West Virginia court may be cited by
analogy121 since the plaintiff in equity is not permitted to change
his cause of action by amendment.1
22
This reference to the freedom allowed the defendant in amend-
ing his pleading is not offered as a complaint against that procedure.
Clearly the defendant should not be deprived of his defense if
he has acted in good faith and has done no injury to the other
party which the court cannot correct by the conditions imposed on
allowing the amendment. Consider, however, the time, expense,
and trouble imposed on the plaintiff by a rule which does not per-
mit him the same liberal treatment. In some instances, the plain-
tiff may be as effectively deprived of his right to recover as the
lZO Martin v. Anderson, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 19 (1827); Tomlinson's Adm'r
v. How's Adm'r, 21 Va. (Gilm.) 1 (1820). Even code states were not inclined
to allow amendments which asserted so-called unconscionable defenses, such
as the statute of limitations or usury, but there is a tendency to recede from
this attitude, especially where there has been accidental default or where
the defense is used as an instrument of justice. PmLLIPS, CODE PLEADING 565.
Unexcused delay in the offering of an amendment, resulting in expense
to the other party, might be held to justify imposing that expense as a con-
dition on which the amendment would be allowed. See Furlow v. Corinth
State Bank, 84 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1936).
M Limitations on the defendant's right to amend his answer are dis-
cussed in McKown v. Silver, 99 W. Va. 78, 128 S.E. 134 (1925); State v.
Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 230, 98 S.E. 214 (1919); Foutty v.
Poar, 35 W. Va. 70, 12 S.E. 1096 (1891). Even within the limitations im-
posed, the court has been lenient in their application. In State v. Central
Pocahontas Coal Co., supra, the court took the position that, even though
the defendant could have known the facts in its amendment at the time the
original answer was filed if the land books had been examined, the amendment
was properly allowed since the matters therein should be before the court
for a fair determination of the controversy.
Even the statute indicates that the defendant is to be 'accorded a more
liberal treatment as to amendments than is to be allowed the plaintiff. Aside
from the limitation that an amendment shall not be allowed which changes
the cause of 'ction, the statute limits the objective to enabling the plaintiff
to sustain the action or suit "for the cause for which it was intended to be
brought" but seems to emphasize that the defendant should be allowed to
amend to enable him "to make full and complete defense." W. VA. CODE
c. 56, art. 4, § 24 (Michie, 1949).
1=2 E.g., Stealey v. Lyons, 128 W. Va. 686, 37 S.E.2d 569 (1946). In
applying the rule the court has accepted q more liberal concept of "the
cause of action". For example, in Doonan v. Glynn, 26 W. Va. 225 (1885),
the plaintiff filed a bill to enforce a vendor's lien retained on the face of
the deed made by the plaintiff to the defendant, but the proof showed that
no deed had ever been made to the defendant, the plaintiff having retained
the title as security for payment. Held, that the bill should not have been
dismissed but that the plaintiff should be allowed to amend the bill to con-
form with the proof, "in as much as the proofs showed that he had a
cause of action of a similar nature to that alleged in his bill." Italics
supplied. Id. at 228.
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defendant would be of his defense. That the rule has had this
effect on the plaintiff has been recognized by the West Virginia
court.1 23 No attempt here will be made to state all of the circum-
stances which may produce this result, but the obvious case of
inability to serve the defendant again with process may be cited.
K. Equal Rights for the Plaintiff
The rule followed in West Virginia and in many code juris-
dictions produces hardship on the plaintiff without considering
whether to allow the amendment would be unjust to the defendant.
The decisions are supported on the basis of a rule designed generally
to prevent any injustice to the defendant, but without purporting
to consider whether the amendment will have that effect in the
case before the court. The harsh results which can flow from the
application of the rule have been shown in the West Virginia cases.
Where the court does allow amendments to prevent hardships,
inconsistencies in the application of the rule appear.124 That the
rule has any exactness becomes a mere delusion.12r As long as the
limitation is contained in the West Virginia rule, the court will be
hindered by the existing precedents in its attempt to allow amend-
ments more freely. Even a new concept of a cause of action has
been introduced to avoid the restriction.1 26 While no objection is
voiced to extensions in the scope of a cause of action, it appears that
the tail may be made to wag the dog. It might be easier to reframe
the rules concerning amendments and avoid the additional prob-
lems involved in broadening the "cause of action." In either event,
the action ought to be so liberal that amendments may be allowed
123 "On writ of error here on behalf of defendant .... we held that this
amendment introduced a new and different cause of action, struck out the
amendment, and remanded the case for a new trial on the original declaration.
This in fact amounted to a denial of any relief to plaintiff; . . . " Shaffer v.
Western Maryland Ry., 93 W. Va. 300, 304, 116 S.E. 747, 749 (1923).
124 See text at pages 43-51 supra.
225 A comparable situation existed in the federal courts in actions at law
prior to the adoption of the new federal rules. There was a "verbal re-
quirement that the cause of action remain unaltered", but the courts appear
to have adopted a rather broad concept of a cause of action. Cases in
which amendments were allowed despite the restriction are summarized in
3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrtCE 815-816. Professor Moore states that an im-
portant factor in the allowance of such amendments was the lack of prejudice
to the opposing party, as demonstrated by his failure to object to the evidence
as it was introduced, or by his knowledge of the true facts, or by the
fact that the original pleading described the occurrence sufficiently well
to put him on notice that he should be prepared to meet any claim involving
it. Id. at 816.
120 See text at page 50 supra.
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in those cases where a restrictive view of a cause of action now
exists, including those cases which view a change in the legal theory
of recovery as a change in the cause of action.
The trend today in other jurisdictions is to allow amendments
freely to permit a final adjudication on the merits if no actual preju-
dice to the other party is shown, irrespective of whether the amend-
ment would formerly have been deemed a change in the cause of
action.127 Two West Virginia statutes have this effect. One permits
misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant, to be
corrected by amendment. 12 The other permits an amendment to
obviate an objection that a suit or action was not brought on the
right side of the court; or if the plaintiff has proceeded on the wrong
side of the court, it permits an amendment to conform the plead-
ings to the proper practice after the case has been transferred to
the proper forum.129 Other jurisdictions have gone much further
and have not restricted the liberalized rule to limited situations.
The model for this movement has been Federal Rule 15.130
L. The Federal Rule131
Like the West Virginia statute the federal rule is divided into
parts, one of which refers to amendments generally and another
refers to amendments to conform the pleadings to the evidence.
Rule 15 (a), after providing for one amendment as a matter of
127 CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 115.
128 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 34 (Michie, 1949).
128 W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 4, § 11 (Michie, 1949).
130 The jurisdictions having the more liberal provisions as to amend-
ments are listed in CLARK, CODE PLEADING 710 n. 33. Citation to the statute
of each state is included.
131 Rule 15 reads, in part, as follows:
"(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a mat-
ter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if
the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and
the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so
amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a
party may amend his pleading only by lRave of court or by written con-
sent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice
so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or with-
in 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
"(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
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course,132 if made within a specified time, 33 provides that otherwise
a party may amend his pleading only with leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party, but that leave of court shall be
freely given when justice so requires. Rule 15 (b) provides that if evi-
dence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. A continuance may be granted to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence. If issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried with either express or implied consent of the parties, they
are treated as if they had been raised by the pleadings, and amend-
ments may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even
after judgment, to cause the pleadings to conform to the evidence
and to raise the issues tried.13 4
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.
The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party tp
meet such evidence.
"(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading."
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
132 In this respect the rule may be more restrictive than the West
Virginia procedure, for the statute contains no limitation as to the number
of times that the plaintiff may of right amend his declaration or bill before
the appearance of the defendant. W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 24 (Michie,
1949). Note, however, that the federal rule allows this privilege to any
party if it is exercised within the time provided. See note 133 infra.
133 The amendment may be made at any time before a responsive pleading
is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is per-
mitted and the action has not been placed on the trial calendar, the amend-
ment may be made within twenty days after the pleading was served.
134 The rule provides, however, that failure to amend to cause the plead-
ings to conform to the evidence and to raise the issues tried does not affect
the result of the trial of the issues. See the cases cited in 3 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcTncE 846 n. 17. Compare the West Virginia procedure where it does
not appear that an issue has been mde upon matter alleged in a pleading.
The statute provides that no judgment or decree shall be arrested or reversed
because of such defect when, without objection by any party, the case has
been tried in the absence of such issue and it is apparent from the record
and the evidence (a) that the trial was conducted as if an issue had been
made upon such matter or (b) that no evidence pertaining to such matter
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No distinction is made in the rule between defenses and claims;
the plaintiff and the defendant have equal rights under the rule.3 5
Where amendments are made before trial, by leave of court,
the rule resembles the West Virginia procedure, but the language
therein leaves no doubt that the technical restriction imposed by the
West Virginia statute has been eliminated. If justice requires the
amendment, leave shall be freely given.136 Even the emphasis on
what the court should do has been changed. 137 The effect is compa-
rable to this modification of the West Virginia statute: after the ap-
pearance of the defendant the court shall allow any amendment if
justice will be promoted thereby. 38 Under the rule the federal
courts have not been hesitant to allow amendments to present the
real issues of the case where the party seeking the amendment has
not been guilty of bad faith, such as acting for the purpose of delay,
and the opposing party would not be unduly prejudiced or the
trial of the issues unduly delayed.1 39 The trial court continues to be
was offered and it is reasonably apparent that the parties have treated such
matter as waived or abandoned. W. VA. CODF c. 58, art. 1, § 2 (Michie, 1949).
This provision was inserted by the revisers in 1931. Earlier. cases resulted
in reversal of judgments on these facts because of a technical rule of the
common law that the record must show an issue before the case was ready
for trial. For a criticism of the earlier cases, see a note by Professor Carlin
in 29 W. VA. L.Q. 128 (1923).
135 In addition to the defendant's being denied the privilege of any
amendment as of right in West Virginia, note. the discussion of a more
liberal treatment being allowed the defendant than the plaintiff when an
amendment with leave of court is sought. See text at pages 54-56 supra.
136 The word "freely" was used advisedly in order to obviate any prior
technical restrictions on amendments. 3 MooRE, FmmDu. PRACTICE 828. The
restrictions imposed upon the allowance of amendments by code states, such
as no substantial change in the cause of action or defense being permitted,
are not applied under the rule. Id. at 831-833.
137 "Shall" allow is used in lieu of "may" allow.
138 Caveat: the writer does not intend to suggest that this language alone
should be used in any rule designed to eliminate the restriction that an
amendment may not be allowed which changes the cause of action. That
limitation was originally imposed by the court when the statute read that
amendments might be allowed "if substantial justice will be promoted there-
by." W. Va. Acts cc. 71, 120 (1882); W. Va. Acts c. 41 (1911). The omission of
the word "substantial" therefrom and the deletion of the express prohibition
that the cause of action may not be changed might not alone be sufficient
to avoid an interpretation similar to that in the Snyder case. See text at
page 38 supra. Express language to the effect that the limitation shall no
longer apply ought to be included in any rule designed to accomplish this
result.
130 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 828, setting forth many illustrations of
the liberality with which amendments prior to trial have been allowed under
the rule. The limitations on this liberality as to amendments with leave
of court ought also be applied to amendments made "as a matter of course".
For example, if such amendments are made merely for the purpose of delay,
the court on motion should have the right to strike it. See HauBuRN, op. cit.
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vested with discretion in allowing amendments, but abuse thereof
may be shown unless the refusal is based on some ground showing
that justice does not require the amendment. 4 0 No longer should
the court refuse to allow an amendment on the technicality that it
would result in a change in the cause of action or defense or be a
substantial change therein. The former restriction on amendments
has been replaced by a rule of fairness. If that requirement is
satisfied, the pleadings may be amended before trial so that the
real issues between the parties will be presented for trial.'4 '
The same liberality exists concerning amendments at and after
the trial. The purpose is to permit the case to be decided on its
merits, irrespective of the pleadings,142 as long as no injury to the
opposing party will result therefrom. The cause of action, including
the theory of recovery, or the defense may be changed either by
amendment, where an objection to the evidence is made, 4 3 or by
the introduction of evidence alone if no objection to its introduction
is made, 4 4 an amendment thereafter being made to conform the
supra note 76, §§ 310, 311 (1897). Some statutes expressly so provide.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 708-710. The procedure suggested would be comparable
to that in West Virginia where the plaintiff files his amended pleading in
the clerk's office in vacation of the court subject to the right of the court
- to dismiss the amended pleading at the plaintiff's cost if the amendment
was improper. W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 25 (Michie, 1949).
140 The wording of the rule leads to this result, namely, "leave shall
be freely given when justice so requires." The cases collected by Professor
Moore indicate that the courts have liberally allowed amendments under
this direction but that the trial court will be supported in its refusal to
allow amendments where the reason for such action is not based on a
mere technicality but rather on a layman's concept of fair play. 3 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 833-841. See also CLARK, CODE PLEADING 710 n. 33.
141 Amendments to accomplish this objective have been allowed in England
for many years. The rules under the Judicature Act of 1873 provided in
part that all such amendments should be made as might be necessary for
the purpose of determining the real questions or question in controversy
between the parties. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 706. See also the statement
by Bramwell, L. J., in Tildesley v. Harper, 10 Ch. D. 393, 396 (1878), quoted in
CLARK, supra, at page 707 n. 26, to the effect that his practice had always
been to give leave to amend unless the party applying was acting mala fide
or by his blunder had done some injury to the opposing party which could
not be compensated by costs or otherwise.
142 See note 141 supra.
14 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.14. Professor Moore states: "The
party opposing the amendment should not succeed by arguing a technical
change in the 'cause of action' or 'defense', since that merely means 'legal' and
not 'actual' surprise. He must show that he would be prejudiced in main-
taining his action or defense on the merits by the admission of the evidence."
Ibid. See Rule 15 (b) quoted in note 131 supra. Note the breadth of the
illustrations shown in note 144 infra.
'44 3 id. § 15.13. Professor Moore gives these examples of what may be
accomplished under this rule, so long as the opposing party has not been pre-
judiced in presenting his case. "Thus a plaintiff may sue on one contract and
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pleadings with the issues which were in fact tried. 145 If there be an
objection to the admission of evidence, which goes to the merits
of the controversy between the parties, an amendment to raise the
issues should be allowed unless the objecting party can show that
he will be actually prejudiced thereby,1 46 not merely that the amend-
ment would involve a different claim or defense but that he is not
prepared and could not have been expected to be prepared to meet
the evidence offered.147 Even if he can make this showing, the court
may allow the amendment and grant a continuance so that the
objecting party may be able to meet the evidence.148 Allowing the
amendment with a continuance seems desirable even where the
objecting party is actually surprised if the person seeking to amend
has acted in good faith and is assessed with the costs to that stage
of the proceeding.1 49 Several times in allowing amendments the
West Virginia court, though using the test of whether the cause
recover on another; may sue on the theory of respondeat superior and re-
cover on the theory of the vicarious liability of an employer of an independent
contractor; or may sue for patent infringement and also recover for unfair
competition." Ibid. He has collected other examples in the notes to the
cited section, such as suing for a tort and recovering for breach of a con-
tract.
If the parties have not expressly consented to try issues not raised by
the pleadings, implied consent thereto may be shown. See Rule 15 (b) quoted
in note 131 supra. Consent may be implied where evidence on the issue was
introduced without objection. El Paso Electric Co. v. Surrency, 169 F.2d
444 (10th Cir. 1948); Vernon Lumber Corp. v. Harcen Const. Co., 155 F.2d 348
(2d Cir. 1946). In a note citing the latter case, Professor Moore calls at-
tention to the cases which refused to permit an amendment after judgment
which brought into the case some extrinsic issue or changed the theory
on which the case was actually tried, even though there was evidence in
the record (introduced as relevant to another issue) which would support
the amendment. He approves of these decisions on the basis that consent
to try an issue should not be implied "where the parties do not squarely
recognize it as an issue in the trial." 3 MOORE, FEDRAL PRACTICE 847, 848 n. 23.
145 Note that although the rule requires issues tried by consent to be
treated as if raised by the pleadings and provides for amendments of the
pleadings to raise such issues, the result of the trial of the issues is not
affected by a failure to amend the pleadings. The effect of this provision
has been called an automatic amendment of the pleadings. CLARu, COnE
PLEADING 712; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 805. Judge Clark includes in a
note a list of the states having rules to the same effect with citations to
the applicable statutes. See the West Virginia analogy in note 134 supra.
146 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 712; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 805, 849.
147 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 723 n. 70, quoting Fullerton, J., in Bowers
v. Good, 52 Wash. 384, 386, 100 Pac. 848, 849 (1909) as follows: "The fact
that the amendment may introduce a new issue is not alone ground for
denying it. The true test is found in the answer to the question, is the op-
posing party prepared to meet the new issue."
14s Sce authorities cited in note 146 supra.
149 Compare the view of Bramwell, L. J., summarized in note 141 supra.
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of action was changed, seems to have considered the real problem
to be whether the objecting party needed a continuance.'"0
The liberality permitted by these parts of the rule needs one
limitation. So far nothing has been mentioned which would limit
the amendment to the transaction or occurrence set forth in the
original pleadings.:',' Perhaps it usually would involve the same
matter. However, even though there may be no reason to limit the
amendment to the same transaction or occurrence originally set
forth, there ought to be some device to prevent a party from using
an amendment to recover on a stale claim. The West Virginia
court has repeatedly held that the amended pleading relates back
to the time of filing the original pleading.15 2 No difficulty has
been encountered as to claims not growing out of the transaction
asserted in the original pleading, for the court has applied an even
more restrictive meaning to a "cause of action" and an amendment
has not been permitted if it involved a new cause of action .5
All would agree that a different claim, against which the statute
of limitations has run at the time the amendment is made, should
not become the basis for recovery. However, the restrictive meaning
given to a "cause of action" by the West Virginia court has pre-
vented amendments which asserted a right to recover on the original
claim under a different theory of law or which asserted claims
growing out of the same general facts involved in the original
pleading. These should not be treated as stale claims. If the
amendment does set up a wholly different factual basis for recovery,
the amendment ought not to relate back to the time of filing the
original pleading.
Rule 15 (c) contains the needed limitation. It provides that
whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
150 Buffa v. Baumgartner, 58 S.E.2d 270, 279 (W. Va. 1950); Larzo v. Swift
& Co., 129 W. Va. 436, 441, 40 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1946); Elkhorn Sand & Sup-
ply Co. v. Algonquin Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 110, 114, 136 S.E. 783, 784 (1927);
Shires v. Boggess, 72 W. Va. 109, 111, 77 S.E. 542, 544 (1913). The similarity
in effect between refusing to allow an amendment and the granting of a
continuance has been discussed in the text at page 42 supra. Of course,
the problem of whether a continuance shall be allowed arises even where an
amendment is allowed.
151 Nothing in Rule 15 (a) or (b) places this limitation on amendments.
See the quotation in note 131 supra; also 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 845.
15r Morrison v. Judy, 123 W. Va. 200, 13 S.E.2d 751 (1941); Corrick v.
Western Maryland Ry., 79 W. Va. 592, 91 S.E. 458 (1917); Kuhn v. Brown-
field, 34 W. Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890); Lamb v. Cecil, 28 W. Va. 653 (1886);
Hart v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 6 W. Va. 336; see Shires v. Boggess, 72 W. Va.
109, 112, 77 S.E. 542, 544 (1913).
'Z; See discussion in the text at pages 43-51 supra.
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arose out of the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.154 This prevents
recovery on stale claims but avoids a restrictive construction of the
term "cause of action." The approach here is not greatly different
from that involved where an amendment is made in a case trans-
ferred from equity to law or vice versa.155 Also, the Larzo case,18
which permitted by amendment the addition of a claim arising out
of the same occurrence, illustrates the concept. In both cases an
amendment which relates back is now permitted in West Virginia,157
though one represents a change in the legal theory of recovery and
the other permits an additional claim to be asserted. Even though
the amendment relates back, recovery is not being permitted on
stale claims. Rule 15 (c) is merely based on the theory that ".... a
party who is notified of litigation concerning a given transaction or
occurrence is entitled to no more protection from statutes of limita-
154 See quotation of the rule in note 131 supra. In effect the West Vir-
ginia rule means that amendments which involve the same cause of action
relate back to the filing of the original pleading, for these are the only amend-
ments which are allowed. See text accompanying notes 152, 153 szupra.
The federal rule here has the same effect except that (1) the amendment
may be allowed even though the amended pleading does not relate back to
the date of the original pleading, and (2) a broader concept of a "cause
of action" is adopted in determining whether the amended pleading shall re-
late back than is adopted by the West Virginia court in deciding whether an
amendment shall be allowed. For a detailed discussion of this concept of
a cause of action, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 19.
155 Such amendments in the pleadings would be deemed changes in the
causes of action and would not be permitted in the absence of an exception
to the rule. Gibons v. Denver Brokerage & Construction Co., 17 Colo. App.
167, 67 Pac. 913 (1902); but see Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207, 211
(1918). Compare the express statutory prohibition against an amendment
changing a proceeding by motion into a formal action at law, or vice versa.
IV. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 24 (Michie, 1949). See, however, note 157 infra.
IAG Discussed in the text at page 50 supra.
157 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 11 (Michie, 1949) permits such amend-
ments as are necessary to conform the pleadings to the practice proper in
the forum to which the case is transferred. See also note 155 supra. This
section was inserted in 1931 and was taken verbatim from the Virginia
Code. Revisers' note. The Virginia court had held prior to this adoption
that such amendments, unless they make out a new case, relate back to
the date of the filing of the original pleading. Thomas Branch & Co. v.
Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc., 147 Va. 522, 137 S.E. 614 (1927).
The court in reaching this conclusion relied heavily upon the leading case
for this proposition, namely, Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207 (1918).
Under the federal rule an amendment which asserts an entirely new claim
will not relate back. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 852.
Although the question of relation back was not raised in the Larzo case,
many cases have held that amendments which are allowed relate back to the
time the original pleading was filed. See note 152 supra.
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tion than one who is informed of the precise legal description of
the rights sought to be enforced."1581
There may be practitioners in West Virginia who have been
astounded by the suggestion that the evils in our present law on
amendments be eliminated by the adoption of a rule similiar to
the federal rule. Their amazement is understandable. The basic
approach in West Virginia procedure has been to view pleadings
as an end in themselves. Rule 15 is merely representative of the
difference in the objective of the federal rules. In federal courts
pleadings are viewed only as a means to a proper presentation of
the case on its merits. The pleadings are to assist and not to deter
in the accomplishment of this purpose. 159 If that viewpoint is used,
and the writer believes that any other is difficult to justify, there is
nothing startling about the proposal.
(Continued in a forthcoming issue of this Review.)
15s 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACricE 851. Many examples of amendments
which have been held to relate back are collected by Professor Moore. Id.
at 853-854. Among these are listed amendments which change the theory
of the action from one in contract to one in tort, which change the action
from one in equity to one at law, and which change the theory of recovery from
negligence of the defendant's employees in the use of equipment to negli-
gence in its construction. With these illustrations, the West Virginia cases
refusing to allow amendments and thus requiring a new action should be con-
trasted. See text at pages 43-51 supra. However, one case discussed by
Professor Moore refused to allow relation back of an amendment which
merely added claims growing out of the same occurrence set forth in the
original pleading. This decision is criticized as having been based on a con-
ceptualistic notion of a cause of action. The approach used by the West
Virginia court in the Larzo case accomplished a more liberal result and al-
lowed such claims or "elements of damages" to be asserted by amendment.
See text at page 50 supra.
159 See quotation in text at page 47 supra, per Mr. Justice Black, in
Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197, 200 (1938).
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